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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the city of San Francisco implemented a first-in-the-nation
cigarette litter abatement fee.1 To help address the staggering cleanup costs
of cigarette butt litter, the city began charging twenty cents on a pack of
cigarettes.2 This figure was not calculated arbitrarily. San Francisco, a city
that is justifiably proud of its beaches, conducted an extensive audit showing
the costs of cigarette butt litter. 3 This audit showed that the city spent

*
Michael Freiberg, J.D., is a Staff Attorney with the Public Health Law Center
in St. Paul, Minnesota. He has also worked as an Adjunct Professor at the William Mitchell
College of Law, teaching courses in Legislation and Public Health Law. He has a B.A. from
Georgetown University and a J.D. from the William Mitchell College of Law. The author
wishes to thank Melinda Hexum for her research assistance as well as members of the
Cigarette Butt Pollution Project for their knowledge of the issue of cigarette waste.
1
See Jesse McKinley, Cost of Cigarette Litter May Fall on San Francisco’s
Smokers, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2009), www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/us/19smoke.html?_r=0
(“Officials here say the municipal fee would be the first in the country to take aim specifically
at cigarette butts, particularly filters . . . .”). For text of the San Francisco ordinance, see S.F.,
CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 105.1–.5, 105.9 (2013), available at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/
gateway.dll/California/administrative/chapter105cigarettelitterabatementfeeord?f=templates$f
n=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:sanfrancisco_ca$anc=JD_105.9.
2
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 105.3.
3
JOHN E. SCHNEIDER ET AL., HEALTH ECON. CONSULTING GRP. LLC, ESTIMATES
OF THE COSTS OF TOBACCO LITTER IN SAN FRANCISCO AND CALCULATIONS OF MAXIMUM
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approximately six million dollars in 2009 to clean up improperly discarded
cigarettes.4
Cleanup costs are not the only problem caused by cigarette butt
litter. Used cigarette butts contain toxic chemicals that can affect the health
of humans and animals, including arsenic, cadmium, and toluene. 5 Used
cigarette butts have been shown to leach out heavy metals, nicotine, and
ethylphenol in water.6 To make matters worse, they are not biodegradable.7
Cigarette trash is unsightly and can have an adverse economic impact in
areas where it is a problem—particularly in areas where tourism is an
economic driver.8 Finally, discarded cigarette butts can pose a fire safety risk
because of the combustible nature of cigarettes.9
PERMISSIBLE PER-PACK FEES (2009), available at http://www.sfdpw.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/
sfdpw/director/annual_reports/tobacco_litter_study_hecg_062209%5B1%5D.pdf.
4
Id. at 9 tbl.2; John E. Schneider et al., Tobacco Litter Costs and Public Policy:
A Framework and Methodology for Considering the Use of Fees to Offset Abatement Costs,
20 (Suppl. 1) TOBACCO CONTROL i36, i39 (2011), available at http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/
content/20/Suppl_1/i36.full.pdf+html.
5
Cigarette butt waste can leach a variety of chemicals into aquatic and land
environments. See, e.g., J. W. Moerman & G. E. Potts, Analysis of Metals Leached from
Smoked Cigarette Litter, 20 (Suppl. 1) TOBACCO CONTROL i30, i30–i31 (2011), available at
http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/20/Suppl_1/i30.full.pdf+html (finding that smoked
cigarette butts leach heavy metals known to be toxic to living organisms); H. Moriwaki et al.,
Waste on the Roadside, ‘Poi-sute’ Waste: Its Distribution and Elution Potential of Pollutants
into Environment, 29(3) WASTE MANAG. 1192, 1196 tbls.3–5 (2009) (observing that discarded
cigarette butts can release heavy metals and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons into the
environment). The chemicals in cigarette butt waste can poison aquatic and land organisms,
either through environmental exposure to chemicals leached from cigarette butts or direct
ingestion of cigarette butts. See, e.g., Elli Slaughter et al., Toxicity of Cigarette Butts, and
Their Chemical Components, to Marine and Freshwater Fish, 20 (Suppl. 1) TOBACCO
CONTROL i25, i26–i27 (2011), available at http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/20/
Suppl_1/i25.full.pdf+html (observing that smoked cigarette butts are acutely toxic to
representative marine and freshwater fish, with fifty percent mortality observed at a
concentration of ~1 cigarette butt per liter of water); T. Micevska et al., Variation in, and
Causes of, Toxicity of Cigarette Butts to a Cladoceran and Microtox, 50(2) ARCH. ENVTL.
CONTAM. TOXICOL. 205, 207–11 (2006) (observing that cigarette butt leachates are acutely
toxic to the aquatic microorganisms Ceriodaphnia cf. dubia and Vibrio fischeri); Thomas E.
Novotny et al., Tobacco and Cigarette Butt Consumption in Humans and Animals, 20 (Suppl.
1) TOBACCO CONTROL i17, i18–i19 (2011), available at http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/
content/20/Suppl_1/i17.full.pdf+html (finding through a review of published literature, web
searches, surveys, and animal poison control center data that serious poisoning from ingestion
of cigarette butts was uncommon, but possible, among young children and domestic animals).
6
Novotny et al., supra note 5, at i17.
7
Elizabeth A. Smith et al., Whose Butt Is It? Tobacco Industry Research About
Smokers and Cigarette Butt Waste, 20 (Suppl. 1) TOBACCO CONTROL i2 (2011).
8
SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 3, at i38 (collecting studies documenting the
negative impact of litter on tourism).
9
The National Fire Protection Association reports that cigarettes and other
smoking materials contributed to 90,000 fires in 2011, involving 540 civilian deaths, 1,640
civilian injuries, and $621 million in property damage. JOHN R. HALL, JR., NAT’L FIRE
PROTECTION ASSOC., THE SMOKING-MATERIAL FIRE PROBLEM 1 (July 2013), available at
http://www.nfpa.org/~/media/Files/Research/NFPA%20reports/Major%20Causes/ossmoking.
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Tobacco manufacturers so feared the proliferation of laws like the
San Francisco litter mitigation fee that they challenged the law on two fronts.
First, they unsuccessfully challenged the law as an unauthorized tax rather
than a fee. 10 Second, they donated extensively to a successful statewide
ballot initiative that sharply limited the authority of local jurisdictions to
adopt similar measures.11 As one example, Philip Morris contributed $1.75
million to “Stop Hidden Taxes,” a front group funded by alcohol, tobacco,
oil, and business interests to support the passage of Proposition 26.12 Since
the 2010 passage of the initiative, two-thirds of the voting population must
approve any fee or levy in California before a local government can
implement it.13
The San Francisco approach is just one way a state or local
government has attempted to address the problem of cigarette butt litter.14
pdf. Smoking is the leading cause of fire fatalities in multiple countries, including the United
States, United Kingdom, Japan, Denmark, and New Zealand. Several of the largest fire
disasters in the modern era are suspected or known to be caused by discarded cigarettes. Bruce
N. Leistikow et al., Fire Injuries, Disasters, and Costs from Cigarettes and Cigarette Lights:
A Global Overview, 31 PREVENTATIVE MED. 91, 93–94, 94 tbl.2 (2000).
10
Order Granting Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. and Den. Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J.
and/or Adjudication, Kaleh v. City of S.F., No. CGC-09-495326 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 18,
2011). Philip Morris and local cigarette retailers sued to bar collection and enforcement of San
Francisco’s litter abatement fee, claiming that the charge was a tax, in which case it would
have been invalid because it was not passed by two-thirds of the local electorate, as required
by state constitution and statute. Id. at ¶ 2. The California Superior Court determined that, as a
matter of law, the charge was a regulatory fee, not a tax. Id. at ¶¶ 3–14. The court granted the
City and County of San Francisco’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at ¶ 15.
11
Margot Roosevelt, Lawyers, Lobbyists, Politicians Scramble to Determine
Impact of Prop. 26, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2010), articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/14/local/lame-prop26-impact-20101115.
12
See Contributions to Stop Hidden Taxes: No on 25/Yes on 26, A Coalition of
Taxpayers and Employers, ELECTION TRACK, http://www.electiontrack.com/lookup.php?
committee=1323934 (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). Philip Morris made $500,000 contributions
to Stop Hidden Taxes on January 28, 2010, October 7, 2010, and October 20, 2010, as well as
a $250,000 contribution on October 14, 2010.
13
“No local government may impose, extend, or increase any special tax unless
and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and approved by a two-thirds vote.” CAL.
CONST. art. XIII C, § 2(d) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Session Laws). “Tax,” for purposes
of this supermajority requirement, is broadly defined to include “any levy, charge, or exaction
of any kind imposed by a local government.” § 1(e). Certain types of charges are excepted
from the Article XIII C definition of “tax,” including charges “imposed for a specific benefit
conferred or privilege granted directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged.”
§ 1(e)(1)–(7). If a charge is not approved by two-thirds of the local electorate, the burden is on
the local government to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that a levy, charge, or
other exaction is not a tax, that the amount is no more than necessary to cover the reasonable
costs of the governmental activity, and that the manner in which those costs are allocated to a
payor bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor’s burdens on, or benefits received
from, the governmental activity.” § 1(e).
14
Tobacco Control Legal Consortium, Policy Tools for Minimizing Public Health
and Environmental Effects of Cigarette Waste, PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR. 1, 2–5 (June 2013),
http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/tclc-guide-cigarette-waste-2013.pdf (noting
that in addition to mitigation fees, municipalities have addressed the problem of cigarette
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Implementing stronger litter laws, advocating for outdoor smoke-free laws,
increasing the number of ashtrays in public spaces, and increasing public
education regarding smoking and littering are straightforward approaches.
These approaches have generally not been challenged by the tobacco
industry or, if they have, are typically upheld by courts.15 However, these
approaches place the burden of enforcement on state and local governments
and may be costly to administer and enforce.16 Further, neither stronger litter
laws, increasing the number of ashtrays, nor education about the effects of
littering address the root problem: the need to reduce smoking rates.
There are, however, potential novel approaches to addressing the
problem of cigarette litter, which this article will discuss in depth. Several of
these approaches have been considered or adopted by legislative bodies.
Others, once adopted, would be the first of their kind. These actual and
potential laws raise complicated legal issues. If the laws are not drafted in a
way that fully addresses these issues, the viability of the laws may be
threatened. The San Francisco experience, as well as experience in other
tobacco control contexts, demonstrates the critical need to examine these
legal issues well in advance of policy adoption. Regardless of any potential
benefit to public health or the environment, tobacco manufacturers have and
will challenge any effective tobacco control regulation if they view it as a
threat to their bottom line.17
Tobacco control laws have been challenged on a variety of fronts.
Perhaps the most serious legal risk to the regulation of cigarette butt litter,
however, is that a court would find the regulation preempted by federal law

waste through deposit and refund policies, biodegradable filters and unfiltered cigarettes, filter
recycling, and smoke-free laws).
15
See id. at 4–6.
16
For example, the 2009 audit of tobacco litter costs to the city of San Francisco
estimated that administering the litter mitigation fee would cost the city over $880,000 per
year. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 3, at 10.
17
Tobacco manufacturers and retailers have brought numerous challenges against
local and federal tobacco control laws. See, e.g., CHERYL SBARRA, TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL
CONSORTIUM, LEGAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE SMOKING AND COMMON THREATS AND
CHALLENGES: 2009 (2009), available at http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/
default/files/resources/tclc-syn-authority-2009_0.pdf (summarizing legal challenges brought
against smoke-free ordinances from 2004 to 2009); Taverns for Tots v. City of Toledo, 341 F.
Supp. 2d 844, 847–48 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (challenging smoke-free law under the First
Amendment, takings and other grounds); Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F.
Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Disc. Tobacco City &
Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012) (challenging the constitutionality
of multiple parts of the 2009 federal Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act,
including the requirement of graphic warning labels on cigarette packages, on First
Amendment free speech grounds); U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. v. City of N.Y., No. 09
Civ. 10511(CM), 2011 WL 5569431, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 708 F.3d 428, 435 (2d Cir.
2013) (challenging a New York City law banning sale of flavored, non-cigarette tobacco
products as preempted by the federal 2009 Tobacco Control Act).
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as a “tobacco product standard,”18 a concept federal law declares to be within
the sole jurisdiction of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. This
potentially sweeping preemption could impact not only regulations explicitly
adopted for tobacco control purposes, but those with other purposes that
potentially implicate tobacco products.
This article will examine several policy options to address cigarette
butt litter, while considering the advantages and disadvantages of each option
from policy and legal standpoints. This article will then use these and other
options as case studies to determine whether federal law preempts them as a
tobacco product standard. It will conclude that the strongest state and local
policy options to address the issue of cigarette butt litter are those that can be
drafted as sales restrictions rather than as manufacturing requirements.
Finally, it will identify the most promising potential regulation from a public
health standpoint and from a preemption standpoint: a prohibition on the sale
of cigarettes containing filters.
II. POLICY OPTIONS
State and local governments have attempted to regulate cigarette butt
litter in several different ways. In 2001, Maine legislators considered a
deposit and refund program for cigarette litter similar to what some states
have in place for cans and bottles.19 Under this proposal, a one-dollar fee
would have applied to every pack of twenty cigarettes, with a five-cent
refund applied to every cigarette butt returned to a redemption center.20 All
cigarette filters sold in Maine would have been marked with a five-cent
deposit stamp. 21 Uncollected deposit money would have funded antismoking education or been deposited in a fund. 22 This proposal was not
ultimately adopted, partly because residents were concerned about the
cleanliness of handling used cigarette butts, and also because Maine’s
governor did not support the bill.23
Deposit and refund programs pose several advantages. In the context
of beverage containers, deposit and refund programs have been shown to
substantially increase recycling rates. One such program is estimated to

18

Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009) [hereinafter TCA] (codified, in relevant part, at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1333–34 and 21
U.S.C. § 387 et seq.).
19
Jim Burns, Cigarette Butt Deposit Bill Being Considered in Maine,
CNSNEWS.COM (July 1, 2001), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/cigarette-butt-deposit-billbeing-considered-maine-0.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, POLICY TOOLS TO MINIMIZE
CIGARETTE WASTE 7–8 (Mar. 2014), available at http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/
files/resources/tclc-guide-cigarette-waste-2014.pdf.
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increase recycling rates from forty-five percent to eighty-four percent.24 This
suggests that such a program for cigarette butts would be effective in
reducing the amount of cigarette butt litter. A deposit and refund program for
cigarette butts may also have a public health benefit. Increasing the price of
cigarettes has been shown to reduce smoking rates, 25 suggesting that
increasing the price of a pack of cigarettes—even if the increase is ultimately
returned to consumers through a refund program—would lead to fewer
people smoking.
There are several potential drawbacks to such a proposal. First,
although uncollected deposit funds could potentially be used to fund the
administration of this program, it may still require set up and administration
costs. This proposal has not been attempted anywhere, and some elements of
the proposal—such as the deposit stamp placed on cigarette filters—might
require new technologies. Second, handling cigarette butts may pose
sanitation issues. While Maine’s legislature debated its potential deposit and
refund program, some state residents expressed concerns that the process
would not be sanitary, although their concerns may have ultimately been
overstated.26 Third, because smokers could recoup the price increase through
the refund program, the public health benefit of the price increase (i.e., the
decline in smoking rates) may have been negligible. Finally, like any tobacco
control measure, tobacco manufacturers could later challenge a deposit and
refund program in court. Were it to be proposed in California following the
passage of Proposition 26, it might be challenged as an unauthorized tax.
Some state and local governments have also attempted to create a
cigarette butt recycling program. New York attempted to pass legislation in
2010 and 2013.27 Similar to the Maine bill, this proposal would have created
a one-cent deposit per cigarette. The city of Vancouver, British Columbia,
has also implemented a cigarette butt recycling program. 28 Rather than
creating a deposit on cigarettes, Vancouver places cigarette butt receptacles
on several street corners. After collection, the butts are weighed, sorted, and
shipped to a recycling company at that company’s expense.
24
TIM BUWALDA, RECYCLING REFUND SYSTEM COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, REPORT
MINNESOTA POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.pca.state.
mn.us/index.php/view-document.html?gid=20501.
25
CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, INCREASING THE FEDERAL TOBACCO TAX
REDUCES TOBACCO USE (AND THE TOBACCO COMPANIES KNOW IT) 1 (Apr. 11, 2013),
available at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0021.pdf.
26
Amanda Onion, Maine Proposes Cigarette Butt Redemptions, ABC NEWS
(Feb. 23 2001), http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=94011&page=1; see also Tobacco
Control Legal Consortium, supra note 14, at 2–3.
27
S. 650, 2013 Leg., 236th Sess. (N.Y. 2013), available at http://assembly.
state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=S00650&term=2013&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Votes=Y
&Text=Y; see also Emily B. Hager, A Call to Recycle Cigarette Butts, N.Y. TIMES (May 25,
2010), cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/a-call-to-recycle-cigarette-butts/.
28
City and TerraCycle Launch Cigarette Butt Collection and Recycling Program,
CITY OF VANCOUVER, Nov. 12, 2013, http://vancouver.ca/news-calendar/cigarette-buttcollection-and-recycling.aspx.
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These recycling programs have advantages. Certainly, if more butts
are recycled rather than left on the ground, that would be positive because
there would be less unsightly and unhealthy litter. Further, cigarette butts can
be recycled into potentially useful materials, such as sealants, adhesives,29
and shipping pallets.30
There are potential downsides to this approach, however. A butt
recycling program might be costly to administer, particularly if a state or
local government is responsible for placing butt receptacles at every street
corner. Although the Vancouver program was partly subsidized by a private
business, there is no guarantee that the business will be available to every
community or that it will be able to subsidize Vancouver’s program far into
the future. Further, the technology for recycling cigarette butts is untested.
Cigarette butts contain many harmful constituents, and there is no guarantee
that they will be removed through a recycling process.31 As with the deposit
and refund program, the one cent fee created under the New York proposal
might be attacked by tobacco manufacturers as an unauthorized tax. Finally,
recycling cigarette butts does nothing to reduce smoking rates. Indeed, it
might make smoking seem more socially acceptable and “green.” Recycling
cigarette butts completely exempts cigarette manufacturers from addressing
an environmental problem they created.
A policy option that does place the burden of addressing the cigarette
butt litter problem where it arguably belongs—on cigarette manufacturers—
is product stewardship. In the context of the cigarette butt litter problem, a
product stewardship approach—which has been used successfully for
products like batteries, paint, carpet, and pharmaceuticals—would require the
tobacco industry to assume responsibility for the entire lifecycle of
cigarettes. In 2010, Maine adopted a product stewardship law.32 While this
law did not specifically apply to cigarettes, some have identified it as a
potential model to address the issue.33 Under this law, the Maine Department
of Environmental Protection is responsible for designating categories of
products as subject to the law. The manufacturers of those products are then
responsible for administrative and operational costs of collection,
transportation, and recycling or disposal.34
The most notable advantage of this policy option is that it would
place the financial burden of enforcement on the tobacco industry rather than
on cash-strapped state or local governments. There are some potential
29

Tobacco Control Legal Consortium, supra note 14, at 4.
Brian Hutchinson, Vancouver Declares War on Cigarette Butts With New
Recycling Program, NAT’L POST, (Nov. 13, 2013), http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/
11/13/brian-hutchinson-vancouver-declares-war-on-cigarette-butts-with-new-recyclingprogram/.
31
See, e.g., Tobacco Control Legal Consortium, supra note 14, at 4.
32
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1771–75 (2013).
33
Richard L. Barnes, Regulating the Disposal of Cigarette Butts As Toxic
Hazardous Waste, 20 (Suppl. 1) TOBACCO CONTROL i46–i47 (2011).
34
§§ 1771–75.
30
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drawbacks. Product stewardship is untested in the context of cigarette butt
litter, and it is possible that environmental and public health problems could
persist. A system such as Maine’s also places considerable discretion in an
unelected agency.
A more dramatic policy option was proposed very recently in
California. In January 2014, a member of the California Assembly proposed
prohibiting the sale or distribution of any cigarette containing a single-use
filter.35 This approach has the benefit of being simple and easy to enforce, as
the operative language of the legislation is two sentences long.36 It is also
possible that prohibiting the sale of filtered cigarettes could reduce smoking
rates, since they have been shown to appeal to smokers in ways that filterless
cigarettes do not. 37 Further, cigarette filters have been shown to have no
benefit to health.38 Removing them from the market may have no adverse
health effects.
There are potential drawbacks to this approach, however. Tobacco
manufacturers have proved devilishly ingenious in adapting their products to
account for new regulations.39 It is certainly possible that they could attempt
to circumvent such legislation through creative means, such as marketing
reusable filters. 40 Additionally, requiring the removal of filters from
35
A.B. 1504, 2013–14 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (introduced Jan. 14, 2014),
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/postquery?bill_number=ab_1504&sess=CUR
&house=B&author=stone_%3Cstone%3E.
36
Id. The legislation reads:
No person or entity shall sell, give, or in any way furnish to another
person, of any age, in this state, a cigarette utilizing a single-use filter
made of any material including, but not limited to, cellulose acetate, or
other fibrous plastic material, or any organic or biodegradable material.
The prohibition under this subdivision applies to any direct or indirect
transaction, whether made in-person in this state or by means of any
public or private method of shipment or delivery to an address in this state.
Id.
37
Thomas E. Novotny et al., Filtered Cigarettes and the Case for an
Environmental Policy on Cigarette Waste, 6 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 1, 12
(2009).
38
See, e.g., L.T. Kozlowski & R.J. O’Connor, Abstract, Cigarette Filter
Ventilation is a Defective Design Because of Misleading Taste, Bigger Puffs, and Blocked
Vents, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL i40–i50 (2002), available at http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/
content/11/suppl_1/i40.abstract?ijkey=ee5550702d9b4e1e7fa32c5351207379da74bf57&keyty
pe2=tf_ipsecsha.
39
See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, NOT YOUR GRANDFATHER’S
CIGAR: A NEW GENERATION OF CHEAP AND SWEET CIGARS THREATENS A NEW GENERATION OF
KIDS 1 (Mar. 13, 2013), available at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/content/what_we_do/
industry_watch/cigar_report/2013CigarReport_Full.pdf
(showing
that
small
cigar
manufacturers manipulated the weight of products to take advantage of more favorable tax
rates for large cigars); Press Release, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, FDA Acts to Prevent
Philip Morris from Evading New Ban On Promoting Cigarettes as “Light” or “Low-Tar”
(June 29, 2010), available at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press_releases/post/id_1215
(showing that, after prohibition on cigarettes marketed as “lights” went into effect, cigarette
manufacturers sold brands in different “colors” corresponding to lights and non-lights).
40
Novotny et al., supra note 37.
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cigarettes might not remove all hazardous chemicals from the products, as
tobacco remnants may still contain hazardous leachates. 41 Indeed, it is
possible that cigarette manufacturers would somehow make the products
more toxic in response to a prohibition on the sale of filtered cigarettes.42
These four options—deposit and refund programs, filter recycling,
product stewardship, and a prohibition on the sale of single-use filters—have
been adopted or proposed in some U.S. jurisdictions. Beyond these existing
laws, one can imagine a myriad of other unexplored approaches for state and
local governments to regulate cigarette waste. For purposes of this article,
two potential untested approaches will be examined.
First, a state or local government could require cigarettes to contain
biodegradable filters or could prohibit the sale of cigarettes containing nonbiodegradable filters. 43 This has the potential to reduce the adverse
environmental impacts of cigarette butt litter. However, this approach would
likely require the development of new technology, although some companies
may already be developing this technology. 44 It is also possible that this
approach would normalize smoking or allow cigarette manufacturers to
advertise their products as environmentally friendly. 45 A state or local
government requirement that cigarettes contain biodegradable filters would
also raise serious preemption issues, which will be discussed later in this
article.
Second, a state or local government could adopt a broad policy that
would affect a range of consumer products including cigarettes. This article
will discuss a prohibition on products containing bisphenol-A. 46 This
compound is included in many consumer products, including some cigarette
filters, and contributes to several adverse health impacts, including
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and thyroid hormone disruption.47 Such a
broad policy would potentially have broad health effects. However, it would
affect a range of products and would also face potentially serious legal
41

Barnes, supra note 33, at i46.
Novotny et al., supra note 37.
43
Id. at 11; see also H.R. 405, 434th Leg., (Md. 2014), available at http://mgaleg.
maryland.gov/2014RS/bills/hb/hb0405f.pdf.
44
See, e.g., Aaron Cantú, New ‘Green’ Cigarette Butts Biodegrade Within
Days—And Can Even Sprout Into Grass, ALTERNET (Feb 12, 2014), www.alternet.org/
environment/new-green-cigarette-butts-biodegrade-within-days-and-can-even-sprout-grass?
akid=11499.1074977.15jeck&rd=1&src=newsletter957901&t=19.
45
Id. at 12.
46
Joe M. Braun et al., Variability and Predictors of Urinary Bisphenol A
Concentrations During Pregnancy, 119(1) ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. 131, 131 (2011) (noting
that other sources have indicated that cigarette filters contain bisphenol-A). For reviews of
studies of the potential health effects of bisphenol-A exposure, see generally J. R. Rochester,
Bisphenol-A and Human Health: A Review of the Literature, 42 REPROD. TOXICOL. 132
(2013); B. S. Rubin, Bisphenol A: An Endocrine Disruptor with Widespread Exposure and
Multiple Effects, 127 J. STEROID BIOCHEM. MOL. BIOL. 27 (2011).
47
Braun et al., supra note 46, at 131; see generally Rochester, supra note 46;
Rubin, supra note 46.
42
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issues, most notably preemption.
III. PREEMPTION
A. Existing Authority on Product Standard Preemption
Potentially, the most significant challenge to state and local cigarette
litter regulations is based on federal preemption. Before examining the
potential for state and local regulations of cigarette butt litter to be preempted
as a product standard, some background on federal regulation of tobacco is
necessary. In 2009, Congress adopted and President Barack Obama signed
into law the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA).48
This groundbreaking law gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the
authority to regulate tobacco products for the benefit of public health.49 It
preserved the authority of state and local governments to adopt tobacco
control laws in several areas, including sale, distribution, possession,
advertising, promotion, and fire safety. 50 However, other tobacco control
laws were left exclusively to Congress and the FDA. These include laws
related to tobacco product standards, adulteration, labeling, and good
manufacturing standards.51
The TCA does not specifically define the phrase “tobacco product
standard.” 52 However, the law does indicate that product standards may
include “provisions respecting the construction, components, ingredients,
additives, constituents, including smoke constituents, and properties of the
tobacco product.” 53 The law also gives several examples of product
standards, including regulations relating to characterizing flavors, nicotine
yields, the use of pesticides in the growing of tobacco, and prohibitions of
categories of tobacco products. 54 Provisions for the testing of tobacco
48

TCA, 123 Stat. 1776.
TCA § 3, 123 Stat. at 1782–83.
50
See TCA § 916(a)(2)(B), 123 Stat. at 1823–24 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 387p(a)(2)(B)) (preserving the authority of states and localities to adopt laws relating to sale,
distribution, possession, advertising, and promotion of tobacco products, or relating to fire
safety standards for tobacco products).
51
See TCA § 916(a)(2)(A), 123 Stat. at 1823 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 387p(a)(2)(A)) (preempting state and local laws imposing requirements related to “tobacco
product standards, premarket review, adulteration, misbranding, labeling, registration, good
manufacturing standards, or modified risk tobacco products”).
52
“Tobacco product standard” is not defined in the “definitions” section of the
TCA, 21 U.S.C. § 387, or in any other section of the Act (search of Pub. L. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776, for “tobacco product standard” does not turn up any provision explicitly defining the
term).
53
21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(4)(B)(i) (2012).
54
The TCA specifically states that the FDA cannot prohibit certain categories of
tobacco products or require nicotine yields to be reduced to zero. 21 U.S.C. § 387g(d)(3).
However, those regulations would still fall within the category of “tobacco product
standards,” so they are relevant to determine the meaning Congress intended to give the term.
See id. (limiting the power of the FDA to prohibit certain categories of tobacco product or to
49
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products are also considered product standards.55
In two cases involving similar local ordinances, courts have
considered what constitutes a product standard. In 2009 and 2012
respectively, the cities of New York, New York, and Providence, Rhode
Island, adopted similar ordinances restricting the sale of flavored noncigarette tobacco products.56 The New York ordinance prohibited the sale of
flavored tobacco products except in “tobacco bars,”57 of which there were
eight. 58 The Providence ordinance prohibited the sale of flavored tobacco
products except in “smoking bars.”59
The tobacco industry challenged both ordinances, arguing that they
were in fact product standards that should be preempted by the TCA.60 To
date, however, courts have upheld both ordinances. The First and Second
Circuits held that local units of government retain broad authority to regulate
the sale and distribution of tobacco products. The Second Circuit went so far
as to acknowledge “Congress’s explicit decision to preserve for the states a
robust role in regulating, and even banning, sales of tobacco products.”61 The
district court in that case further noted that “local sales restrictions, including
prohibitions of subclasses of tobacco products, are not within the scope of
the Preemption Clause at all.”62 This suggests that the Second Circuit would
have upheld the New York ordinance even if it had not included the
exemption for “tobacco bars.”
The courts also examined a tobacco product standard that would be
preempted by the TCA. The Second Circuit held that the TCA’s preemption
clause “distinguishes between manufacturing and the retail sale of finished
products.”63 That is, a local regulation that directly affects the manufacturing
require reduction of nicotine yields to zero within the same section granting the FDA the
power to promulgate tobacco product standards).
55
§ 387g(a)(4)(B)(ii)–(iv).
56
17 N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE §§ 17-713 to -718 (adopted Oct. 28, 2009),
available at http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/LAWSSEAF.cgi?QUERYTYPE=LAWS+&
QUERYDATA=@SLADC0T17C7SC2+&LIST=LAW+&BROWSER=BROWSER+&TOKE
N=47190315+&TARGET=VIEW; PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14-309
(adopted Jan. 9, 2012), available at http://library.municode.com/HTML/11458/level3/
PTIICOOR_CH14LI_ARTXVTODE.html#PTIICOOR_CH14LI_ARTXVTODE_S14-309SA
FLTOPRPR.
57
17 N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 17-715.
58
U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. v. City of N.Y., 708 F.3d 428, 432 (2d Cir.
2013).
59
PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14-309.
60
U.S. Smokeless Tobacco, 2011 WL 5569431, at *1 (tobacco manufacturers and
distributors challenging New York City’s flavored tobacco ordinance as preempted by the
2009 Tobacco Control Act); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Tobacco Outlets, Inc. v. City of
Providence, No. 12-96-ML, 2012 WL 6128707, at *11 (D.R.I. Dec. 10, 2012), aff’d, 731 F.3d
71 (1st Cir. 2013) (tobacco retailers and manufacturers challenging Providence’s flavor
ordinance as, among other things, preempted by the 2009 Tobacco Control Act).
61
U.S. Smokeless Tobacco, 708 F.3d at 436 (emphasis added).
62
U.S. Smokeless Tobacco, 2011 WL 5569431, at *34 (emphasis added).
63
U.S. Smokeless Tobacco, 708 F.3d at 434.
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of a tobacco product would be preempted; a regulation of the sale of a
tobacco product would not. Consistent language is in the TCA’s purpose
statement, which says that one purpose of the law was to authorize the FDA
to set “national standards controlling the manufacture of tobacco products.”64
It seems clear that under federal law, tobacco product standards
relate to the manufacture of tobacco products. However, the FDA does not
have unfettered authority to adopt regulations relating to the manufacture of
tobacco products. Indeed, Congress placed an additional limitation on the
FDA’s ability to issue tobacco product standards. Before the agency can
promulgate a regulation containing a product standard, it must determine that
the standard would be “appropriate for the protection of the public health.”65
In making this determination, the agency must consider the population level
impact of the standard, the likelihood that existing tobacco users will quit,
and the likelihood that nonusers will start.66 Although Congress could adopt
a tobacco product standard on a basis unrelated to public health, the FDA
could not do so. 67 For example, the agency could not adopt a product
standard for economic development purposes, such as a requirement that a
tobacco product contain an ingredient grown in an economically depressed
region.
It is therefore likely that the FDA could not adopt a regulation
relating to cigarette butts for litter abatement reasons. The issue is not
completely cut-and-dry. A regulation addressing the issue of cigarette butt
litter might have an environmental benefit, and that benefit might also
improve public health.68 That public health impact, however, would likely be
unrelated to tobacco cessation and initiation. The FDA has not yet adopted a
single product standard beyond those required by Congress in the TCA.69
Given the murkiness of the agency’s authority to adopt a regulation targeting
cigarette butt litter, it seems unlikely that the agency would do so. State and
local governments seem more promising, and this article will now turn to
their authority.
B. State and Local Regulations Impacting Tobacco Products
The preceding discussion is helpful to determine the scope of the
authority of state and local governments to regulate tobacco products.
Assuming that the FDA cannot adopt product standards on bases other than
public health, it is not immediately clear whether the same is true for state
and local governments. The preemption language of § 916(a)(2)(A) clearly
64

TCA § 3(3), 123 Stat. 1776, 1782.
21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(3)(A) (2012).
66
§ 387g(a)(3)(B).
67
§ 387g(a)(3)(A).
68
See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text (summarizing what is known about
the potential adverse environmental and health effects of cigarette butt litter).
69
21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1).
65
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removes from state and local governments the ability to adopt tobacco
product standards. 70 However, it is not clear from the text of the TCA
whether that term is limited to product standards based on public health, as is
suggested by § 907. 71 If it is not so limited, state and local governments
could adopt tobacco product standards on bases such as aesthetics (e.g., litter
mitigation), workplace safety, or economic development, unless some other
constitutional principle prevents them from doing so. The Second Circuit’s
decision, stating that product standards relate to the manufacturing of
tobacco products, suggests that the preemption language is broader, and thus
state and local governments cannot adopt tobacco product regulations for any
purpose.72 However, the court was not considering tobacco product standards
outside of the public health context—the flavored tobacco product
ordinances were adopted with the intention of protecting public health73—
and the statement can be viewed to a certain extent as dicta.
Even if the TCA preempts state or local regulations of tobacco
product manufacturing on any basis—not just public health—a question
remains as to whether tobacco product standard preemption applies to
regulations that reach beyond tobacco products. State and local regulations of
broad applicability may incidentally touch on tobacco products as well.74 In
order to determine whether the TCA has a preemptive effect, it will be useful
to identify several state or local laws adopted for reasons other than public
health or that apply to a broad range of products and potentially impact
tobacco products.
One example of an existing state law falling into both categories can
be found in the workplace safety context. Cigarette smoke contains
hexavalent chromium (Cr (VI)), a known carcinogen. 75 Several states
regulate this product. 76 California, for example, has a comprehensive
regulation concerning workplace exposure to Cr (VI). 77 Among other
requirements, this regulation sets exposure limits, describes how the
exposure quantity should be measured, and regulates disposal of

70
TCA § 916(a)(2)(A), 123 Stat. at 1823 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 387p(a)(2)(A)).
71
See TCA § 907(a)(3) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(3)) (stating that the FDA
“may” adopt a tobacco “product standard” if the standard “is appropriate for the protection of
public health”).
72
U.S. Smokeless Tobacco, 708 F.3d at 434.
73
See Sewell Chan, Ban on Flavored Tobacco Products Becomes City Law, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2009), cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/ban-on-tobacco-flavoredproducts-becomes-city-law/?_r=0 (indicating that New York’s flavored tobacco ban was
motivated by City Council concerns regarding the increasing use of flavored non-cigarette
tobacco among the city’s young people).
74
See infra notes 75–96 and accompanying text.
75
David Bernhard et al., Metals in Cigarette Smoke, 57 IUBMB LIFE 805, 806
(2005), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1080/15216540500459667/pdf.
76
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-162 (2014).
77
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 5206 (2014).
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contaminated clothing. 78 Some of these requirements apply at an “action
level” of 2.5 micrograms of Cr (VI) per cubic meter of air,79 and further
requirements apply at the “permissible exposure limit” of five micrograms
per cubic meter of air.80 Although these may not reach the levels of Cr (VI)
in cigarette smoke, the California Department of Industrial Relations is given
broad authority to regulate Cr (VI) and would have the authority to lower the
exposure limits to the level found in cigarette smoke. It is therefore useful to
examine this Cr (VI) regulation because it is an example of a law that applies
well beyond the realm of tobacco products but could potentially reach
tobacco products. Further, it relates to workplace safety, a somewhat
(although not entirely) distinct field from public health.
A second law that has potential applicability to tobacco products, but
also to other products, relates to pesticides. Ethylenebis (dithiocarbamate)
(EBDC) pesticides are used as fungicides to control blight in tomato, potato,
and other fruit and vegetable crops.81 EBDC fungicides have also been used
in tobacco cultivation, and the tobacco industry has gone to great lengths to
weaken regulations of this product.82 Because EBDC fungicides are probable
carcinogens, 83 at least one state has regulated the product. For example,
Maine classifies it as a “restricted use pesticide,” which can be sold only by
licensed dealers and used by licensed applicators. 84 Because EBDC
fungicides are sometimes used on tobacco crops, did Maine unknowingly
create a tobacco product standard by regulating them? This is an important
question because the TCA appears to regard regulations affecting pesticide
use in tobacco crops as product standards.85
A third category of laws potentially applying both to tobacco and
other products relates to mercury, another harmful chemical potentially
present in cigarette smoke.86 Some state laws broadly address the issue of
mercury in ways that could potentially implicate tobacco products. For
example, Rhode Island’s Mercury Reduction and Education Act87 contains

78

Id.
§ 5206(b).
80
§ 5206(c).
81
Frederick M. Fishel, Pesticide Toxicity Profile: Ethylenebis (dithiocarbamate)
Pesticides, U. FLA. IFAS EXTENSION 1 (2011), http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/PI/PI10100.pdf.
82
Patricia A. McDaniel et al., The Tobacco Industry and Pesticide Regulations:
Case Studies from Tobacco Industry Archives, 113(12) ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. 1659, 1661
(2005).
83
Id.
84
01-026-040 ME. CODE R. § 1(B) (LexisNexis 2013).
85
See generally TCA § 907(a)(1)(B), 123 Stat. 1776, 1799 (2009) (mandating a
“tobacco product standard” that prohibits tobacco product manufacturers from using U.S. or
foreign-grown tobacco that contains pesticide residue exceeding levels specified by federal
law).
86
See Bernhard et al., supra note 75, at 807 (noting that cigarette smoke is a
“minor” source of human exposure to mercury).
87
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-24.9-1 et seq. (West 2010).
79
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several restrictions on products “with a component that contains mercury.”88
This includes restrictions on sale, labeling, and disposal.89
Finally, bisphenol-A (BPA) is an estrogen-mimicking chemical used
in some plastic containers and other consumer products, which has raised
several health concerns in humans.90 It is also used in some cigarette filters.91
Several states regulate the presence of BPA in certain consumer products.92
Although most of these laws focus on products used primarily by children
(e.g., baby bottles and sippy cups),93 some laws have a broader reach. In New
York, for example, the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation may
authorize the labeling of any product that does not contain BPA.94 Although
the TCA regards labeling as a separate issue than product standards, the
preemptive scope of the law is the same in both contexts.95 Another BPA law
gives a state agency broad authority to regulate BPA in products, although it
appears that authority has not been exercised in the context of cigarette
filters.96 So, since these laws may apply to tobacco products as well as other
non-tobacco consumer products, did the TCA preempt them? This question
will be addressed in the next section.

88

§ 23-24.9-3(10) (defining “mercury-added products”).
§§ 23-24.9-6, -8, -9.
90
Marla Cone, Recipe for High BPA Exposure: Canned Vegetables, Cigarettes,
and a Cashier Job, ENVTL. HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.environmental
healthnews.org/ehs/news/bpa-and-pregnant-women.
91
Braun et al., supra note 46, at 131 (noting that other sources have indicated that
cigarette filters contain BPA).
92
The states that have laws restricting or banning BPA in certain consumer
products include California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New York, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 108940–
41 (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21a-12b, -12c, -12e (West 2013); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2509 (West 2011); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 24-304 (West 2011); 105
MASS. CODE REGS. § 650.020 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325F.172–.175 (West 2013);
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 37-0501–0511 (McKinney 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1512 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.280.010–.060 (West 2013); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 100.335 (West 2013).
93
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21a-12b, -12c, -12e (banning sale of
reusable food and beverage containers, infant formula and baby food receptacles, and thermal
receipt paper containing BPA); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2509 (banning sale of children’s
products containing BPA); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 24-304 (banning sale of cups and
bottles intended to be used by children under the age of four); 105 MASS. CODE REGS.
§ 650.020 (banning sale of BPA-containing, reusable children’s food and beverage
containers); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325F.172–.175 (banning sale of BPA-containing cups or
bottles intended for use by a child under age three, as well as formula, baby food, or toddler
food stored in BPA-containing packaging); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.335 (banning sale of BPAcontaining baby bottles or spill-proof cups intended for children age three and younger).
94
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 37-0507.
95
TCA § 916(a)(2)(A), 123 Stat. 1776, 1823 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 387p(a)(2)(A)).
96
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 108940(d) (West 2013).
89
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C. The Effects of Product Standard Preemption on State and Local
Regulations
Before examining whether the TCA preempts the state and local
cigarette butt policy options identified in the introduction, it will be helpful
to determine whether the TCA preempts the existing laws mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs. This will help determine the extent of the TCA’s
preemptive effects. The Supreme Court has held that Congress has the
authority to preempt state law and that this preemption can be express or
implied. 97 We will first consider whether the state laws are expressly
preempted.
The TCA’s express preemption provision states clearly enough that
state and local governments cannot adopt regulations that are “different from,
or in addition to, any [provision of the TCA] relating to tobacco product
standards.”98 Although the term “tobacco product standard” is not defined,99
it seems reasonably certain from previous discussion that it would include a
regulation relating to the manufacture of a tobacco product, particularly if the
regulation serves a public health purpose. 100 Thus, a state regulation
requiring that no cigarette filter contain toluene, for example, would seem to
be a clear example of a preempted product standard, particularly since it
would presumably be justified on a public health basis. There would likely
be a different result if a state prohibited the sale of cigarettes with filters that
contain toluene. That would be a sales restriction more akin to New York
City’s restriction on the sale of flavored tobacco products than a
manufacturing standard.
Most state regulations that potentially implicate tobacco product
standards are not so clear-cut, however. This can be for two primary reasons.
First, the state law may have been adopted for a reason other than public
health, such as aesthetics or economic development—topics not addressed by
the TCA. An example of this is the regulation relating to hexavalent
chromium,101 which was adopted for workplace safety purposes. Second, the
subject matter of the state law may be broader than tobacco products. The

97
See, e.g., Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76–77 (2008) (noting that
courts interpreted the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, to permit Congress to
preempt state or local law, either expressly or impliedly).
98
TCA § 916(a)(2)(A).
99
See supra note 52 (noting that the relevant sections of the TCA do not define
“tobacco product standard”).
100
See supra notes 52–68 (discussing the statutory context of the “product
standard” provisions of the TCA and discussing the federal preemption challenges to New
York City’s and Providence’s flavored tobacco ordinances, which required federal courts to
interpret the “product standard” and preemption provisions of the TCA).
101
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 5206 (2014).
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regulation relating to hexavalent chromium falls into this category as well,102
as do the regulations relating to EBDC fungicides,103 BPA,104 and mercury.105
The question then becomes whether the regulation at issue is a
“tobacco product standard,” a term which is not explicitly defined in the
TCA.106 Two aspects of this phrase are potentially ambiguous. First, do all
laws that potentially relate to the manufacture of a product constitute a
“standard”? In addition to the circuit court decisions discussed supra in
Section A, several canons of statutory interpretation can also be potentially
helpful in determining the meaning of the word “standard.”107
Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, general terms are interpreted
to be similar to more specific terms in a series.108 In addition to tobacco
product standards, § 916 of the TCA lists other types of regulations that are
outside the jurisdiction of state and local governments. Specifically, state and
local governments cannot adopt regulations “relating to tobacco product
standards, premarket review, adulteration, misbranding, labeling,
registration, good manufacturing standards, or modified risk tobacco
products.”109 Using the concept of noscitur a sociis, these other terms can be
used to shed light on the definition of “tobacco product standards.” Concepts
such as adulteration and good manufacturing standards clearly relate to the
manufacture of tobacco products. This suggests that the phrase “tobacco
product standards” should be construed to relate to the manufacture of
tobacco products as well. Indeed, this would be consistent with the Second
Circuit’s decision that tobacco product standards relate to the manufacture of
tobacco products.110
The Supreme Court has also looked to sources such as a statute’s
preamble to help determine the meaning of ambiguous terms. 111 Further,
judicial decisions siding with tobacco companies have followed this
approach. 112 The TCA contains forty-nine findings and ten purpose
102

§ 5206.
See supra note 84.
104
See supra notes 94, 96.
105
See supra notes 87–88.
106
See supra note 52 (noting that the relevant sections of the TCA do not define
“tobacco product standard”).
107
See supra Part III.A (discussing circuit court decisions regarding product
standard preemption).
108
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 571 (1995); see also BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1160–61 (9th ed. 2009) (“A canon of construction holding that the meaning of an
unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it.”).
109
TCA § 916(a)(2)(A), 123 Stat. 1776, 1823 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 387p(a)(2)(A)).
110
U.S. Smokeless Tobacco, 708 F.3d at 434.
111
See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999) (looking to the
findings section of the Americans with Disabilities Act to determine congressional intent).
112
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (looking to statement of
purpose in Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act to determine congressional intent);
see also Richard A. Daynard, How Implied Express Preemption Happened, What It Means to
Trial Lawyers, and Why It Matters, 65 N.Y.U. SURV. AM. L. 475, 477 (2010).
103
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statements, so this is a potentially fruitful area to explore.113 Some of these
statements suggest that Congress intended to vest the federal government
with exclusive jurisdiction over the manufacture of tobacco products. As
noted above, one purpose statement is “to authorize the [FDA] to set national
standards controlling the manufacture of tobacco products.” 114 One of the
findings states that the FDA “is a regulatory agency with the scientific
expertise to identify harmful substances in products to which consumers are
exposed [and] to design standards to limit exposure to those substances.”115
So, some of the findings and purpose statements do suggest that Congress
intended the FDA to be the exclusive agency regulating the manufacture of
tobacco products.
These canons of statutory interpretation suggest that the use of the
word “standards” in the TCA relates to manufacturing and the content of
tobacco products, and that the FDA should have exclusive jurisdiction over
this area, regardless of whether or not the state or local law has a public
health purpose.
However, the second way the phrase “tobacco product standards” is
potentially ambiguous relates to the scope of state and local laws that it
might encompass. If the state or local law relates to a host of products—not
merely tobacco products—does it fall within the category of tobacco product
standards? Principles of statutory interpretation can be useful in answering
this question as well.
One canon of statutory interpretation holds that courts are to avoid
the assumption of broad congressional delegation of agency authority if a
statute otherwise limits agency authority.116 The TCA does limit the FDA’s
authority to take certain actions, such as banning classes of tobacco products
or reducing nicotine yields to zero. This suggests that state authority should
be preserved if possible. Further, some court decisions afford deference to
typical functions of state and local governments 117 or traditional state
regulation.118 Public health is certainly an area that has traditionally been left
to the police power of state and local governments.119
It would appear, then, that the FDA is likely the agency responsible
for issuing manufacturing regulations specific to tobacco products. If a state
113

TCA §§ 2, 3, 123 Stat. at 1776–82.
TCA § 3(3), 123 Stat. at 1782.
115
TCA § 2(44), 123 Stat. at 1780. In contrast, however, one finding states that
state governments have an equal role to play in regulating tobacco products: “Federal and
State governments have lacked the legal and regulatory authority and resources they need to
address comprehensively the public health and societal problems caused by the use of tobacco
products.” § 2(7), 123 Stat. at 1777.
116
See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262–63 (2006).
117
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (finding public
health to be one such area).
118
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
119
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (holding that “quarantine laws
and health laws of every description” are within the well-established police powers of a state).
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law reaches products besides tobacco products, however, it should be upheld
insofar as those other products are concerned. Indeed, this was the result in
the seminal tobacco preemption case of Cipollone v. Liggett Group.120 In that
case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that certain state law tort claims against
tobacco manufacturers were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act (FCLAA),121 which preempts states from adopting any
“requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any [properly labeled] cigarettes.”122
In Cipollone, the Court did not invalidate state tort claims in all
contexts. Rather, it held that the state level tort claims were preempted only
as applied to tobacco manufacturers and only where they related to the
advertising and promotion of cigarettes.123 For example, the Court held that
Cipollone’s claims of failure to warn under state law were preempted to the
extent they required tobacco companies’ post-FCLAA advertising to include
“additional, or more clearly stated, warnings.”124 The Court went on to note,
however, that there is no preemption of “claims that rely solely on [tobacco
companies’] testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to
advertising or promotion.”125 The state law tort claims were still valid in the
context of tobacco products as long as they did not relate to advertising or
promotion, so there would clearly be even less concern about preemption if
the claims did not even involve tobacco products.126
With this background, it becomes an easy task to determine whether
the TCA expressly preempts the existing state regulations discussed in this
article, which affect products beyond tobacco. Both Rhode Island’s Mercury
Reduction and Education Act 127 and New York’s BPA labeling statute 128
regulate labeling of products, potentially including tobacco. Labeling has a
similar preemptive scope to product standards, 129 so these laws would be
preempted to the extent they regulate the labeling of tobacco products.
Maine’s regulation of EBDC fungicides, 130 on the other hand, does not
appear to affect labeling or limit the amount of the fungicide that can be
placed on a crop such as tobacco. Rather, it specifies who can sell and apply
the product. It is therefore likely a sales restriction and not a preempted
product standard.
It is not as clear as to whether the TCA would preempt California’s
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Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 504.
Id. at 524–31.
15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2009).
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 504.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 524–25.
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See supra note 84.

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline,

19

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 37 [], Iss. 1, Art. 6

224

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:205

law regulating workplace exposure to hexavalent chromium131 as applied to
tobacco products because the California law would not necessarily regulate
the content of any tobacco products. Rather, it would seek to limit worker
exposure to a potentially harmful product. However, there would at least be
an argument that it is preempted because it could affect the manufacturing of
tobacco products. This could happen if tobacco companies alter their
manufacturing practices to reduce worker exposure to Cr (VI). However, the
Second Circuit noted that many sales restrictions “would likely have some
effect on manufacturers’ production decisions” but upheld the sales
restriction on flavored tobacco products nonetheless. 132 Applying similar
reasoning, a workplace safety regulation should not be preempted even
though it might impact manufacturing practices. Even if it were, the law
would still be in effect in manufacturing settings not involving tobacco.
D. Implied Preemption of State and Local Regulations
Because this article examines policies that would affect not only
cigarette butt litter but also a range of other consumer products, it is useful to
determine whether these state laws would survive a preemption analysis in a
non-tobacco context. Even though it appears that the TCA does not expressly
preempt these laws under most circumstances (i.e., non-tobacco contexts),133
it is still theoretically possible that the state laws are impliedly preempted.134
This possibility can be refuted fairly quickly. The Supreme Court has
recognized two kinds of implied preemption: field preemption and conflict
preemption.135
Field preemption concerns state action in a field that Congress
“intended federal law to occupy . . . exclusively.” 136 But determining the
field in which a statute operates is not necessarily an easy task. For example,
Maine’s EBDC fungicide regulation137 would most logically be viewed as a
regulation of EBDC fungicides only. However, because EBDC fungicides
are a type of pesticide, the regulation could be viewed more generally as a
regulation of pesticide use. More broadly still, since pesticides are typically
used in agricultural settings, it could be viewed very generally as a regulation
of agriculture. Reading a regulation in such a broad context has the potential
for preemption to run wild, since many more state and local regulations
would potentially be vulnerable to preemption. Indeed, one commentator
131
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noted that field preemption opens the door to judicial mischief, because
“[d]efining the field at a certain level of generality becomes the entire
game.”138
Applying the concept of field preemption to tobacco product
standards, one would have to argue that Congress intended to occupy the
field of manufacturing standards for all consumer products—not merely
manufacturing standards of tobacco products—to find field preemption of
the four examined state regulations. This amounts to an argument that in
adopting the TCA, Congress intended to prevent states from adopting
restrictions on the use of BPA in baby bottles. This seems like a specious
argument in the context of a federal tobacco control law, and it appears that
the state laws would survive a field preemption analysis.
Conflict preemption involves two subspecies.139 First, a state action
may make it “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and
federal requirements,” 140 also known as impossibility preemption. Second,
state action may “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,”141 also known as obstacle
preemption. Neither would seem to dictate a result that broad state laws be
overturned. Impossibility preemption would only seem to be an issue if the
FDA and a state agency issued conflicting regulations. For example, assume
that the California Department of Toxic Substances Control issued a
regulation that no consumer product may contain BPA and the FDA issued a
rule that cigarette filters contain a minimal amount of BPA. Were this to
happen, it is likely that the California law would be expressly preempted as
applied to cigarette filters, but the law would otherwise remain intact. The
analysis for obstacle preemption would be similar. While it might be possible
for a broad state law to apply to tobacco products in a way that served as an
obstacle to one of the TCA’s objectives, the solution would be to find the
state law preempted as applied to tobacco products, not preempted
wholesale.
E. Preemption in the Cigarette Butt Litter Context
We now can turn to the state and local policy options specific to
cigarette butts. Before undertaking this task, however, it is worth noting that
cigarette butts themselves are “tobacco products” under federal law. The
TCA redefined “tobacco product” as “any product made or derived from
tobacco that is intended for human consumption, including any component,
138
139
140
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note 136, at 1057.
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part, or accessory of a tobacco product.” 142 A cigarette filter is likely a
component or accessory of a tobacco product, so regulations of cigarette
filters would likely implicate the tobacco product standard provisions of the
TCA.
Several of the policy options related to cigarette butt litter do not
affect cigarettes at the manufacturing stage and do not appear to implicate
tobacco product standard preemption. San Francisco’s litter abatement law
merely applied a fee at the point of sale and clearly did nothing that would
affect the manufacture of tobacco products. 143 Although other California
jurisdictions would not be able to adopt a similar fee because of the passage
of Proposition 26, 144 product standard preemption should not be an issue.
Similarly, the proposed deposit and refund program in Maine 145 applied a
refundable fee at the point of sale but did not implicate the manufacture of
tobacco products. Consequently, product standard preemption should not be
an issue.
The proposed cigarette butt recycling programs in New York146 and
Vancouver147 concern cigarette butts even further downstream. They do not
regulate cigarette butts at the point of sale, but after the cigarettes have been
smoked. Consequently, they are even further removed from the
manufacturing stage and product standard preemption would not be a
concern. Similarly, if applied to cigarette butts, Maine’s product stewardship
law 148 would mandate that cigarette manufacturers take responsibility for
cigarette butts after they have been smoked. It is possible that this would
impact manufacturing decisions, but to apply the Second Circuit’s logic, the
fact that a regulation “would likely have some effect on manufacturers’
production decisions”149 does not mean that it is a product standard.
The proposed California legislation prohibiting the sale of cigarettes
containing single-use filters 150 is analogous to the New York City and
Providence ordinances restricting the sale of flavored non-cigarette tobacco
products. 151 It is a sales restriction that would likely be upheld by courts
against a preemption challenge. The argument that it is a sales restriction
might be even stronger if the sale were allowed in limited settings—adultonly tobacco stores, for example.
Courts would likely uphold a prohibition or restriction on the sale of
cigarettes containing non-biodegradable filters against a preemption
challenge. The fact that biodegradable filters are not yet available might be a
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
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bit more suggestive that such a regulation would be a product standard.
However, the strong language from the courts evaluating the ordinances
restricting the sale of flavored tobacco products152 suggests a sales restriction
would be upheld against a preemption challenge.
The result would probably be different if a state or local government
attempted to prohibit cigarettes from containing biodegradable filters or
filters altogether and didn’t merely attempt to regulate their sale. This would
implicate the manufacture of these products, and would likely be overturned
as a tobacco product standard.
Finally, a blanket prohibition on consumer products containing BPA
would not target tobacco products specifically. However, it would impact
those cigarettes with filters containing BPA. It would require a certain
manufacturing process, and it would be preempted by the TCA as applied to
tobacco products. As applied to other products, however, such a law would
not be struck down as a tobacco product standard.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Laws targeting cigarette butt litter should be drafted in a way that
would be more likely to survive judicial scrutiny. The TCA contains a
savings clause that protects the ability of state and local governments to
adopt laws “relating to or prohibiting the sale, distribution, possession,
exposure to, access to, advertising and promotion of, or use of tobacco
products.”153 The ability of state and local governments to regulate the sale
of tobacco products is a potentially fertile ground for regulations affecting
the problem of cigarette butts. The decisions upholding the New York City
and Providence restrictions on the sale of flavored non-cigarette tobacco
products are testament to this. The district court in the New York case held
that “with respect to regulations relating to, or even prohibiting sales of
tobacco products, local governments are free to go above any federal floor
set either by the [TCA] or by the FDA acting pursuant to it.”154 Thus, while
state and local governments are not allowed to prohibit a certain
manufacturing technique, they are allowed to prohibit the sale of products
manufactured by that technique.
Consequently, without fear of preemption, states could likely adopt
laws prohibiting the sale of cigarettes without biodegradable filters or
prohibiting the sale of cigarettes containing filters. The first option would
certainly help alleviate the adverse environmental impacts of cigarette butt
litter. The second option, however, would have the same environmental
152
Supra notes 61–62. See also Hon. Jon S. Cardin, Md. Informal Op. Att’y Gen.
(Feb. 6, 2014) (copy of opinion on file with the author) (providing an opinion that there is a
possibility that the TCA may preempt Maryland House Bill 405, but proponents may be able
defend the bill as long as the FDA does not promulgate relevant standards for filters).
153
TCA § 916(a)(2)(B), 123 Stat. at 1823 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(2)(A)).
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benefit and likely additional public health benefits. Cigarette filters have
been found to have no health benefits, but many consumers believe that they
do and find unfiltered cigarettes unappealing. Consequently, prohibiting the
sale of cigarettes with filters would not harm public health and might
discourage people from smoking since the only available option would be
less appealing. A state or local government should follow through on
legislation similar to that proposed in California.
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